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TORTS - SUCCESSOR CORPORA TIONS - DEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS - CAN THE LAW AND POLICIES OF STRICT
LIABILITY BE RECONCILED WITH CORPORATE LAW
POLICIES
WHICH
PROTECT
SUCCESSOR
CORPORATIONS IN ORDER TO RESPOND FAIRLY TO
THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY PLAINTIFF? Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md.
613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991) (4-2 decision).
The issue of successor liability in a products liability case involves
questions of both corporate law and strict liability. In this field, a
corporation that acquires the assets of another corporation generally
does not assume the debts and liabilities of the predecessor. 1 The
recognized exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability,
however, were developed to protect creditors and shareholders without regard for the interests of products liability plaintiffs. 2 Because
traditional corporate law principles do not adequately address the
issues presented by tort victims, courts and commentators have
considered new rules which expand the traditional exceptions. 3 One
such rule is the continuity of enterprise theory, under which liability
is imposed based on a continuation of the business of the predecessor
corporation, absent any continuation in ownership.4 In Nissen Corp.
v. Miller,s the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether it
should adopt the general rule of successor non liability with its four
recognized exceptions6 or whether it should add a fifth exception for
continuity of enterprise when determining successor liability in a strict
products liability case. 7
In July 1981, Nissen Corporation bought the trade name, patents, inventory and other assets of the American Tredex Corporation. 8
1. See Liability of Successor for Injury Caused by Product of Predecessor,
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, Nov. 1990, § 7:1, at 10-12 [hereinafter Liability of Successor]. .
2. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986). The general
rule, with its four commonly recognized exceptions, "protects creditors and
dissenting shareholders, and facilitates determination of tax responsibilities,
while promoting free alienability of business assets." Id.
3. See Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 990-91 (D. Md. 1988)
(discussing product line theory and continuing liability doctrine in the tort
context).
4. LOUIS FRUMER & MELVIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.06[3] (1989);
Liability of Successor, supra note 1, §§ 7:19 to 7:24.
5. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991).
6. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
7. Nissen, 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 565.
8. Id. at 615, 594 A.2d at 565.
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American Tredex retained all accounts receivable arising from sales
shipped prior to the purchase date. 9 A written agreement indicated
the intent on the part of Nissen to substantially continue the business
of American Tredex, although American Tredex was to remain in
business. for five years after the transaction. JO The purchase contract
expressly excluded assumption of liability for injuries arising from
any product previously sold by American Tredex.1l The contract
called for a payment of $600,000 on execution and· a fee of four
percent of net sales for the following five year period. 12 Nissen
retained some American Tredex employees, although it was not
contractually obligated to do so. Nissen moved the business from
Indiana to Iowa, and continued to sell replacement parts for equipment sold by American Tredex before the transfer .13
In October 1986, more than five years after Nissen's asset
purchase, a consumer was injured on a treadmill he had purchased
from American Tredex in January 1981. Nearly two years later, in
September 1988, the consumer sued both American Tredex and
Nissen. 14 At the time suit was filed, American Tredex was administratively dissolved. IS
In reversing the judgment of the court of special appeals and
affirming the award of summary judgment for Nissen, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland adopted the general rule of successor nonliability, with its four traditional exceptions; and rejected the continuity
of enterprise theory. This decision may leave some products liability
plaintiffs without a remedy, but it also soundly confirms Maryland's
strict liability policy which requires fault on the part of the seller or
manufacturer in order to impose tort liability.16
The general rule of successor corporation liability is:
[A] corporation which acquires all or part of the assets of
another corporation does not acquire the liabilities and debts

9. Id. at 615-16, 594 A.2d at 565.
10. Id. at 615, 594 A.2d at 565. DUring the five year period for which the seller

11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

was to remain in existence, it was to be known by a new name, AT Corporation.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565.
Id. The suit also named as defendants AT Corporation and Atlantic Fitness
Products, the retailer from whom the consumer had purchased the treadmill.
Id.
Id.
See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976).
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of the predecessor unless: (1) there is an express or implied
agreement to assume the liabilities; (2) the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) the successor
entity is a mere continuation or reincarnation of the predecessor entity; or (4) the transaction was fraudulent, not
made in good faith, or made without sufficient considerationY
Before Nissen, the first, second, and fourth exceptions delineated
above had been codified in the Corporations and Associations Article
of the Maryland Annotated Code. 18 Although the "mere continua17. [d. at 617,594 A.2d at 565-66 (quoting Liability of Successor, supra note I,
§ 7:1 at 10-11). See also Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App.
282,290, 562 A.2d 1286, 1289-90 (1989) (discussing the general rule of corporate
liability when a corporation acquires the assets of another corporation); 15
WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRfVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122, 7123.05 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (examining general rule
of corporate liability, in the products liability context, when there is mere
purchase or acquisition of another company's property); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 4, § 2.06(2) (defining general rule of successor liability).
18. In regard to the express agreement exception, Maryland's Corporations and
Associations Code "provides that a successor corporation is liable for all the
debts and obligations of the transferor to the extent provided in the articles
of transfer." Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 291, 562
A.2d 1286, 1290 (1989) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 3115(c)(I) (1993». When no articles of transfer are filed, the sales agreement is
treated. as "equivalent to the articles of transfer." [d. at 292, 562 A.2d at
1291. See also MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 1-IOI(c) (1993) (defining
articles of transfer as "articles of sales").
In determining implied assumption of liability by a successor corporation,
consideration of the following factors is suggested:
(a) "[T]he effect of the transfer on the predecessor's creditors,"
Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1977);
(b) any "[a]dmission of liability by officers or spokespersons of
the successor corporation," id. at 840;
(c) fact that successor voluntarily pays some debts of predecessor
does not necessarily signify assumption of predecessor's debts, see
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 175 A. 295,
296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934); and
(d) by continuing to perform the predecessor's contracts, the
successor demonstrates intent to assume liability under the contracts,
Automatic Retailers of America, Inc. v. Evans Cigarette Servo Co.,
269 Md. 101, 106-07, 304 A.2d 581, 584-85 (1973) (citing R.E.C.
Management Corp. V. Bakst Serv., Inc., 265 Md. 238, 289 A.2d 285
(1972».
In regard to the consolidation or merger exception, Maryland's Corporations and Associations Code "provides ... that '[t]he successor is liable for
all the debts and obligations of each nonsurviving corporation.'" Baltimore
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tion" exception is not codified, the policy behind this exception
permeates the Corporations and Associations and Commercial Law
Articles. 19 The codified policy seeks to protect the rights of creditors
whenever there is a transfer of assets.20 As noted by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, "[t]he 'mere continuation' exception
reinforces this policy by allowing a creditor to recover from the
successor corporation whenever the successor is substantially the same
as the predecessor.' '21
Underlying the four traditional exceptions is a policy to protect
creditors and shareholders by preventing the predecessor from escaping liabilities and obligations by changing form but not substance. 22
Like Maryland, the majority of states recognizes only the four
traditional exceptions to the general rule 0 f successor nonliability. 23
Many courts have refused to expand successor liability where there
is no causal relationship between the successor corporation's acts and
a consumer's injuries. 24 Because the successor corporation neither
Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 290, 562 A.2d at 1290 (quoting MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 3-114(e)(I) (1993».
In regard to the fraudulent transfer exception, Maryland's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, codified in MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW n §§ 15-201
to 15-214, protects the creditors of a transferor by allowing them to levy on
property conveyed to a transferee if the transfer was made with the intent to
defraud or without fair consideration. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at
290-91, 562 A.2d at 1290 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 15-201 to
15-214 (1990». See also Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp.
1446, 1449 (D. Md. 1988) (stating that "the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act . . . protects the rights of creditors of a corporation which
transfers its assets with an intent to defraud or without fair consideration in
a manner similar to the [fraudulent conveyance] exception").
19. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 297, 562 A.2d at 1293. See, e.g., MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 3-114 to 3-115 (1993); Maryland Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW n, §§ 15-201 to 15214 (1990); Maryland Bulk Transfers Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I, §§
6-101 to 6-111 (1993).
20. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 297, 562 A.2d at 1293.
21. Id. The indicia of mere continuation include: common officers, directors and
stockholders between successor and predecessor; only one corporation exists
after completion of the sale of assets; continuation by purchaser of seller's
business practices and policies; sufficient consideration running to seller corporation in light of assets being sold. Id.
22.Id.
23. See Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613,632-33,594 A.2d 564, 573-74 (1991)
(citing Florom v. Elliot Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado
law); Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987)
(applying Kentucky law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.
1981) (applying Missouri law); Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp.
1619 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982) (applying Florida law»; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 4, § 2.06[2]; Liability 0/ Successor, supra note 1, § 7:1.
24. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986); FLETCHER, supra
note 17, § 7123.05; Liability 0/ Successor, supra note 1, § 7:21.
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placed the defective product on the market nor represented that it
was safe, most courts and commentators reason that it should not
be held responsible for injuries caused by the predecessor's products. 2s
Those courts further assert that extension of successor liability would
frustrate the legitimate needs of certainty and predictability in business transactions because unforeseeable products liability claims complicate transfers, increase transaction costs and inhibit free alienability
of corporate assets.26 Finally, many courts conclude that post-transfer
imposition of liability on the successor corporation defeats the benefit
of the successor's bargain. 27
Nevertheless, courts· in recent years have been confronted with
the argument that the "traditional rule 'runs counter to the products
liability policy of placing the burden on the party most able to bear
the loss by spreading the risk."'28 In an attempt to balance the
interests of creditors and shareholders with those of products liability
plaintiffs, some courts have adopted other approaches which expand
the scope of corporate successor liability. The most popular approaches include the "product line" theory, the "independent duty
to warn" theory, the "bona fide purchaser" theory and the "continuity of enterprise" theory. This casenote focuses on the continuity
of enterprise theory but includes first a brief description of the other
three alternative approaches.
.
Under the product line theory, a successor is held liable for the
defective products of the predecessor if the successor acquires substantially all of the predecessor's assets, continues to produce the
same product line under a similar name, presents itself to the public
as a continuation of the transferor and benefits from the goodwill
of the transferor. 29 One justification for this theory is based on the
elimination of the injured plaintiff's remedy against all but the
successor, because in many instances the predecessor company dissolves shortly after the sale transaction. Additional justifications for
the product line theory include the successor's ability to spread the
risk and cost of product defects among future consumers and the
equity of forcing the successor to assume the burdens associated with
FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.06.
See Polius, 802 F.2d at 83; Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:21.
See Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:21.
Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D. Md. 1988) (quoting
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, § 2.06[3] at 2-184).
29. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10-11 (Cal. 1977) (holding that a party
which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line
of products assumes strict tort liability for any defects in products previously
manufactured by the predecessor business); FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.07
(analyzing state court decisions regarding the product line theory); Liability oj
Successor, supra note 1, § 7:25 (defining the exception based on product line
continuation).

25.
26.
27.
28.
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the benefits of the transferor's gocidwill. 30 The product line theory
has been adopted in California,31 New Jersey,32 Pennsylvania33 and
Washington. 34 Most courts have rejected this theory, however, because of the absence of fault and causation on the part of the
successor corporation and the additional constraint it places on
business transfers. Unlike the established exceptions to the general
rule of successor nonliability, the product line theory imposes liability
absent any continuity in shareholders or an agreement to assume
liability. Liability is premised on the fact that the successor holds
itself out as a continuation of the predecessor and destroys or curtails
consumer remedies by virtue of its acquisition.
The independent duty to warn theory imposes liability on a
successor corporation for failure to warn prior customers of potential
defects in the predecessor's product when a special relationship exists
between the successor corporation and the predecessor's customers. 3S
The requisite "special relationship" is said to exist when the successor
takes over the predecessor's service contracts, repairs and services
the predecessor's products and has knowledge of product defects and
of the location of the product owner. 36
The bona fide purchaser doctrine, like the independent duty to
warn doctrine, is an emerging theory of successor liability that holds
a successor accountable if it knew or should have known of its
predecessor's defective products. 37 While the established exceptions
to the general rule of successor nonliability focus on the form of the
transfer, the independent duty to warn and bona fide purchaser
doctrines focus on the successor's knowledge of product defects.
Both of these doctrines comport with the causation rationale underlying strict liability, and both protect successor corporations from
the imposition of unknown liabilities. Although the successor is not
responsible for placing the defective product on the market under
either theory, the successor's knowledge of defects in the predecessor's products and its contribution to the dissolution of the predecessor indirectly cause the plaintiff's injuries and eliminate his or her
152

30. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 10-11 (1977); FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.07; Liability
of Successor, supra note I, § 7:26.
31. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
32. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
33. See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1981).
34. See Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P .2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
35. Liability of Successor, supra note I, § 7:32.
36. See FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.08; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 4,
§ 2.06[5]; Liability of Successor, supra note I, § 7:33.
37. Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's
Liability for its Predecessor's Defective Products When the Successor Has
Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 848-50
(1988).
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recourse to the predecessor. Both theories prohibit business transfers
that aim to destroy products liability claims by forcing either the
predecessor or the successor to provide for potential claims.
In addition to the four traditional exceptions,38 Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi and Ohio rec·ognize the continuity of enterprise
exception;39 the status of this fifth exception remains uncertain in
New York, New Hampshire and South Carolina. 40 Under the continuity of enterprise theory, a successor corporation is liable for
damages caused by the defective products of its predecessor if there
is a "substantial continuity of pretransaction and posttransaction
business activities resulting from the use of the acquired assets. "41
Substantial continuity is found based on the retention of management, personnel, physical location and assets or the manufacture of
the same product for the same market under the same trade name,
or both.42 Although the traditional mere continuation exception focuses on continuation of the corporate entity, the continuity of
enterprise exception concentrates on continuation of the business
operation or enterprise. 43 Under this expanded exception, a successor
corporation may be held liable despite a lack of continuity of
shareholders or an agreement to the contrary between the predecessor
and successor. 44
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 45 a plaintiff who sustained
injuries while using a power press brought a products liability suit
against the corporate successor that acquired the assets of the original
manufacturer through a cash purchase. 46 The successor corporation
retained the seller's key personnel, assets, general business operations
and name. 47 Additionally, the successor assumed those liabilities
ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the enterprise and the
seller liquidated and dissolved four days after the sale.48 The purchase
agreement required the successor to assume those liabilities reflected
on the seller's balance sheet as of the closing date; no mention was
made in the agreement regarding liabilities which might accrue in the
1992]

38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:19 (citing cases).
40. Liability oj Successor, supra note 1, § 7:22 (citing cases). The continuity of
enterprise exception has been rejected in Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id. (citing cases).
41. Id. § 7:20.
42. FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 7123.06 at 275.
43. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, § 2.06[3]; Liability oj Successor, supra
note I, § 7:20.
44. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974).
45. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
46. Id. at 874-75.
47. Id. at 874.
48. Id. at 875-76.

Baltimore Law Review

154

[Vol. 22

future. 49 Espousing the continuity of enterprise doctrine, the Supreme
Court of Michigan reversed the lower court's summary judgment for
the defendant successor corporation. 50
The decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan was predicated
on its treatment of the case "first and foremost" as a products
liability case. 51 Although the traditional exceptions to successor nonliability were developed to address creditor, shareholder and tax
issues, Michigan's courts and legislature had not yet addressed the
problems of products liability plaintiffs in this context. 52 Owing to
the new and evolving nature of products liability law, and the
unsuitability of existing rules to the problems of tort victims, the
court found it inappropriate for the traditional rules of successor
liability to hinder the development of products liability law in this
area. 53 The court elected to emphasize an approach to successor
liability based on the rationale that a manufacturer is in a better
position than a consumer to bear the cost of injury, to predict and
insure against the risk of defective products and to improve product
quality.54
The court determined that the traditional rules of corporate
successor liability were inadequate to address the needs of products
liability plaintiffs because, regardless of the form of the corporate
transfer,55 once the predecessor corporation becomes defunct, an
injured person is forced to look to the successor corporation for
restitution. 56 In a transaction involving a sale of corporate assets for
cash, the Turner court set forth four principles necessary to establish
a prima facie case of continuity of enterprise:
1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller
corporation, including, apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, and even the
[predecessor's] name.
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of
consideration received from the buying corporation.
49.Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. /d.

at 884.
at 877.
at 878.
at 877-78.
at 881.
at 883. The court reasoned that
it does not make sense or promote justice to require a merger and a
defacto merger to respond to products liability suits, and then to leave
a transfer of assets for cash free from suit, when the needs and
objectives of both the injured party and the corporation are the same
in all three instances.

Id.
56. Id. at 878.
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3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the normal business operations of the seller corporation.
4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world
. as the effective continuation of the seller corporationY
Where a company holds itself out as the effective continuation
of its predecessor and benefits from its goodwill, the court indicated
that it is unfair not to impose the burdens affiliated with the business
on the successor. 58 Finally, the court reasoned that imposition of
liability under the continuity of enterprise theory would not significantly inhibit or interfere with corporate acquisitions because successor corporations are able to anticipate and accommodate products
liability claims through "insurance, indemnification agreements or
escrow accounts, or even a deduction from the purchase price ~ ... "59
In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 60 after the death of the owner of a
sole proprietorship, the employees of the company purchased the
assets of the business for cash and held it out as an ongoing
enterprise. The successor assumed existing service and contract obligations, purchased the goodwill of the business and provided no
notice that a new business had been created. Finally, the purchase
agreement specifically excluded assumption of tort liability by the
successor. In holding the successor corporation liable for injuries
sustained by two employees of the corporation while they were
cleaning a printing press, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, applying New Hampshire law, focused on the continuity
57. [d. at 883-84.
58. [d. at 881. In Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chemicals, 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981), the district court, applying Ohio law, ruled that the successor
could be held liable under the continuity of enterprise theory. [d. at 382. The
court's recognition of the continuity of enterprise theory was primarily based
on Ohio's strict liability policy of "spreading the risk of loss to all consumers
of a product so that the product will bear the social and individual costs of
its own defects." [d. at 381. Because the successor made a "measured business
choice" in acquiring all assets and the benefits of good will and because it
was better able to bear the burdens and protect itself by obtaining liability
insurance, the court concluded that it would be unfair to permit a successor
to avoid its predecessor's tort liabilities. Id. at 382.
Similarly, in Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala.
1979), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that where a successor "purposefully
established an appearance of continuity to promote sales," it should be estopped
from denying products liability, even though it may have an agreement with
the predecessor to the contrary. [d. at 785. The court indicated that the
continuity of enterprise theory was applicable to the facts in Andrews because
under the successor, the same products were manufactured by the same people,
in the same place and the successor attempted to benefit from the reputation
of the seller by holding itself out as a continuation of the seller. /d.
59. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 81B.
60. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
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of the business enterprise. 61 The traditional exceptions to successor
liability were developed to deal with tax assessment and to promote
fairness to creditors and freedom in business transactions. 62 Therefore, the court explained that "where tort liability is concerned, we
should look to factors relevant to the specific claim and not be
bound by the factors that control where other debts and liabilities
are concerned. "63 The court discussed the policies underlying imposition of strict liability on manufacturers, and noted that the same
policies were likewise applicable to those manufacturers' successors
which continued to manufacture and service the predecessors' products and which acquired the experience and expertise of the predecessor.64 Because the successor knows the product, it is better able
to gauge and manage the risk and cost of product defects and to
improve the quality of products. 65 Also, because the successor profits
from the seller's goodwill, it should assume the burdens associated
with that goodwill, regardless of whether or not it placed the product
on the market. 66 The court highlighted the fact that the same employees who were involved in the manufacture of the defective
product continued to produce the same product in the same plant
for the successor, in order to de-emphasize the significance of the
change in ownership of the entity, so that it no longer served as a
dispositive factor rendering the successor immune from liability. 67
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 1153-54.
at 1152-53.
at 1153-54.
at 1154.

67. [d.; see also Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454 (D.S.C.
1977) (relying on the reasoning of Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145
(1st Cir. 1974), to establish that the plaintiff's claim could properly be considered under the continuity of enterprise exception); cf Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.
Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985). In Mozingo, the successor continued to
manufacture the predecessor's product, maintain service contracts and sell parts
related to the product and promote the long history of production of the
product. [d. at 173. The same management and employees continued to work
for the successor in the same location. [d. The new corporation was represented
in the management of the predecessor and "there was a substantial degree of
identity of stockholders . . . in the sense that the [predecessor's) stock was
simply converted to [successor] stock." [d. at 176. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's instructions
regarding successor liability under the continuity of enterprise exception (applying Mississippi law) and held that because the same management and
stockholders were represented in both the predecessor and successor corporations, liability was not imposed without responsibility. [d. at 175-76. The fact
that the successor corporation was represented in the stockholders and management of the predecessor made it aware of the potential for products liability
claims, so both predecessor and successor were in the same position to assume
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Finally, the court stated that the "protective language in the purchase
agreement, specifically excluding the assumption of any tort liability
... cannot determine the rights of third parties, when no effort to
give notice of the change was made."68
In Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co. ,69 the Supreme
Court of Ohio refused to adopt the product line theory because it
represented a serious departure from the traditional exceptions to
successor nonliability that the C01lft considered best addressed by the
legislature. 7o Although the court also considered the expanded continuity view espoused by Turner, it found that view inapplicable
under the facts at issue. 71 As a result, the court embraced only the
four traditional exceptions, in contradiction with the Bonee court. 72
The court's declaration that the mere continuation exception has been
narrowly construed in order to protect corporations from unassumed
liabilities, and its fear that adoption of the product line theory
"would cast a potentially devastating burden on business transfers
and would convert sales of corporate assets into traps for the
unwary,"73 strongly suggest that Ohio is not willing to find liability
beyond the established exceptions.
The state of the law in New York with respect to the continuity
of enterprise theory is somewhat unclear due to a split in lower court
decisions. In Schumacher v. Richards Shear CO.,74 the Court of
Appeals of New York discussed the continuity of enterprise doctrine
and applied the test set forth in TurnerY The court found, however,
that the facts before it did not warrant application of either the
continuity of enterprise or product line exceptions, and consequently
adopted neither theory. 76
In Radziul v. Hooper, Inc.,77 the Monroe County Supreme Court
interpreted Schumacher as rejecting both the product line and continuity of enterprise theories, in accord with the majority of other
jurisdictions. 78 Based on that interpretation and the facts before it,

68.

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.

the risk spreading role that underlies strict liability. [d. at 176. Lastly, consistent
with strict liability policies, the court found that because the product did not
leave the company until after the successor had assumed control, there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the successor actually placed the
product on the market. [d. at 171.
Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1153.
507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987).
[d. at 337.
[d. at 336.
See supra note 58.
Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 337.
451 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983).
[d. at 198.
[d. at 197-98.
479 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
[d. at 326. See also Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 858
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the court's decision focused on a discussion of successor liability in
the duty to warn context. 79
On the other hand, the Queens County Supreme Court in Salvati
v. Blaw - Lenox Food & Chemical Equipment, Inc. 80 accepted the
continuity of enterprise theory based on Turner's compelling logic. 8)
The court reasoned that because the continuity of enterprise doctrine
was inapplicable to the facts in Schumacher, the court of appeals
was unable to properly consider the theory. 82 Consequently, the court
of appeals' failure to adopt the theory was not interpreted as a
rejection of the theory, but rather as a decision to leave the issue
open for consideration and possible adoption in a proper case. 83 The
Queens County court decided to adopt the continuity of enterprise
theory based on its view that the holding in Turner was consistent
with traditional tort principals; i.e., that liability was imposed on a
successor based on its act of holding itself out as a continuation of
the original enterprise. 84 Secondary reasons that influenced the court's
decision include the unavailability of a remedy against the original
manufacturer, the availability of the successor as a "deep pocket"
to provide a remedy and to spread risk, and the fairness of forcing
the successor to bear the burdens affiliated with the benefits of its
asset and goodwill purchase. 8s
Finally, in Diaz v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 86 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, relying on Cyr,
held a successor corporation liable because it had continued the
predecessor's general business operations in all material respects.87
The court agreed with Cyr's reasoning that it is unfair to allow a
successor corporation to avoid liability solely because no stock is
transferred, when the essence of the transaction is an ongoing business
with no change in employees, product, supervision and plant. 88 Be-

79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.

(1st Cir. 1986) (applying New York law, court concluded that the Court of
Appeals of New York in Schumacher rejected the product line and continuity
of enterprise theories espoused in Turner and Alad).
Radz;ul, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
497 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
[d. at 247.
[d. at 245.
[d. at 245-46.
[d. at 247.
[d. at 244-45.
707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
707 F. Supp. at 101. All of the predecessor's assets were purchased for cash.
[d. Although the successor did not retain any of the upper-tier management
or directors, it did hire 950/0 of the predecessor's employees, assumed manufacturing contracts and continued to use the same plant, designs, assets, patents
and customer lists. [d. at 101-02.
[d. at 101.
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cause the successor incorporated the predecessor's ongoing business
into its own, the transaction was in effect a "de-facto merger. "89 In
addressing the liability of a subsequent successor and co-defendant,
however, the court found no liability based on Turner's continuity
of enterprise doctrine because the original successor continued in
existence after the sale transaction. 90
The principal case cited in opposition to the continuity of
enterprise doctrine is Po/ius v. Clark Equipment CO.9J In Polius, the
plaintiff brought suit against a successor for injuries resulting from
an allegedly defective crane that was designed and manufactured by
a predecessor corporation. 92 .Under the sales agreement, the successor
purchased most of the seller's assets for cash, including customer
lists, goodwill, tradenames, trademarks and patents. 93 The successor
assumed liability for trade accounts, payroll and other contract
obligations. On the other hand, the successor expressly rejected
assumption of tort liabilities, and the seller agreed to indemnify the
purchaser against all claims arising out of its operations. 94 Although
the agreement did not require that the seller dissolve, it became a
corporate shell within a year after the sale, and dissolved four years
later. 9S The successor continued to manufacture cranes, provide replacement parts to its distributors, and service machines through
distributors. 96 At the time of the plaintiff's accident, however, the
successor was no longer manufacturing cranes. 97 No officers or
directors of the seller were retained by the successor. 98
In Po/ius, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, applying the law of the Virgin Islands, rejected the continuity
of enterprise theory, primarily because it disregards the causation
requirement that is fundamental to tort law.99 Since a deterrence
rationale underlies the causation requirement, the continuity theory

89.
90.
91.
92.

[d. at 102.
[d. at 102-03.
802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986).
[d. at 76.

93. [d.
94. [d.

95. [d.
96. [d.

97. [d. at 83 n.9.
98. !d. at 76.
99. [d. at 81-82. The Restatement of Torts requires a causal relationship between
the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 01' TORTS
§ 402A (1965). By imposing liability on the successor corporation, the continuity
of enterprise theory imposes liability on an entity which has no connection
with the acts causing the injury. Polius, 802 F.2d at 81. It is the predecessor
which caused the harm by placing the dangerous product on the market. [d.
at 82.
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promotes further inconsistency by "imposing liability where deterrence would not be furthered. "100 Although the continuity theory is
based on a need to compensate strict liability plaintiffs, the court
saw "no principled distinction between victims of corporate negligence and those whose recovery rests on § 402A .... "101 The fact
that strict liability enables plaintiffs to obtain judgment without proof
of negligence does not mean that it was necessarily implemented to
improve a plaintiff's ability to collect on that judgment. 102 In opposition to the notion that successor corporations are best able to
assume the cost of product defects, the court cited significant difficulties many manufacturers face in attempting to obtain products
liability insurance, including problems with availability, affordability
and adequacy of coverage. 103 Lastly, the court found that the continuity of enterprise doctrine concentrates exclusively on the needs
of the products liability plaintiff while discarding the "equally valid
arguments of the business world."I04
In 1988, two judges of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, considered the continuity of enterprise doctrine in the context of two products liability
cases. First, in Smith v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., lOS
Judge Niemeyer, relying on the reasoning in Cyr and the lower
court's decision in POIiUS,I06 predicted that Maryland would accept
100. Polius, 802 F.2d at 82.
101. Id. at 80.
102. Id. Plaintiffs with judgments based on negligence claims have always had an
equal right to priority as those with strict liability judgments; as such, these
claimants are in the same situation when a company dissolves, leaving nothing
behind to satisfy judgments. Id. The Polius court did note, however, that the
time lag that may elapse between the time of manufacture and the resultant
injury does present one significant distinction between strict products liability
claims and negligence claims. Id. Since products liability claims are more likely
than negligence claims to entail lengthy time lags between the harmful act and
the resultant injury, product liability plaintiffs may have more difficulty collecting judgments due to intervening corporate dissolution. Id. at 80-81. The
courts adopting the continuity of enterprise theory, however, have not advanced
this consideration. Id. at 81.
103. Id. at 82. Additionally, the court noted that although a large corporation may
be able to spread the cost of product liability claims over its broad customer
base, smaller corporations are unable to do the same. Id. at 81.
104. Id. at 83. Reasonable predictability is important in business decisions. The
imposition of unknown liabilities on corporate successors complicates transfers,
increases transaction costs and defeats the legitimate expectations of the parties.
Id.
105. 737 F. Supp. 1446 (D. Md. 1988).
106. In Polius, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment on the basis of the continuity of enterprise doctrine. Polius, 802
F.2d at 75. This grant was reversed by the decision of the third circuit court
of appeals to reject the continuity of enterprise doctrine. Id. at 84.
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the continuity of enterprise theory. The court was persuaded by the
equitable concept that the substitution of one corporation for another
manifested an intent by the successor to assume the predecessor's
tort liability, despite an expressed intent to the contrary. 107 The court
in Smith, however. did not hold the successor liable under the
continuity of enterprise theory because the original manufacturer
remained a viable entity. 108
Second, in Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Judge Smalkin
predicted that Maryland would reject the continuity of enterprise
theory. In support of his prediction, Judge Smalkin noted Maryland's
"particularly conservative" stance in the field of products liability
law, the general policy to construe the four established exceptions
narrowly, and limited recognition of successor liability in corporate
matters in Maryland case law}1O
In Miller v. Nissen Corp., the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland rejected the product line theory but adopted an expanded
interpretation of the mere continuation exception where the "predecessor corporation is functionally extinct at the time [an] action is
filed."111 The court seemingly adopted the continuity of enterprise
theory based on the need to protect consumers "who [have] no
information relative to ... internal corporate changes. "112 In reversing the decision of the court of special appeals, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland adopted the four traditional exceptions to the general
rule of successor nonliability, but refused to adopt the continuity of
enterprise theory}l3 To assess the applicability of the rules of corporate successor liability in the context of a products liability case,
the court first examined the policies supporting Maryland's adoption
of strict liability.
In Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 114 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted strict liability in tort as set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).115 The basic justifications for strict

107. Smith, 737 F. Supp. at 1447, 1449.
108. The court noted that one of the key elements of the continuity of enterprise
doctrine was the unavailability of the predecessor to be sued for its tortious
conduct. [d. at 1451.
109. 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988).
110. [d. at 991-92.
Ill. Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. 448, 456, 575 A.2d 758, 762 (1990). The
court referred to this expanded exception as the "substantial continuation"
exception, i.e., the continuity of enterprise. /d. at 455, 575 A.2d at 762.
112. [d. at 457, 575 A.2d at 763 (quoting Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80
Md. App. 282, 296 n.lO, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 n.1O (1989».
113. Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 632, 594 A.2d 564, 573-74 (1991).
114. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section provides:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
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liability are that (1) a seller has a special responsibility toward the
consumer and (2) the seller is in the best position of all possible
parties to take precautions against product defects and to absorb and
protect against the cost of injuries caused by products that it manufactures and markets. 1l6 Although the Phipps court found these
reasons persuasive. it did not view strict liability as a "radical
departure from traditional tort concepts"117 that dispenses with the
element of fault. Instead. the court found that a seller was impliedly
at fault when it placed a defective product on the market. 1I8 Additionally. because the seller was in a better position to guard against
defects. it would be inequitable to force consumers to bear the costs
of injuries as a result of their inability to meet the proof requirements
of a negligence action. 119 By holding a seller accountable for placing
a defective and unreasonably dangerous product on the market which
injures a user, the "Restatement reaffirms the notion of a causal
relationship between the defendant's [seller's] acts and the plaintiff's
[user's] injury-a concept that is fundamental to tort law."120 Con-

dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer. or to his property. if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product. and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product. and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
[d.
116. Miles Lab .• Inc. v. Doe. 315 Md. 704. 717. 556 A.2d 1107. 1114 (1989);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
117. Phipps. 278 Md. at 351-52. 363 A.2d at 963. See Nissen. 323 Md. at 622-23.
594 A.2d at 568-69; Miles Lab., Inc .• 315 Md. at 717. 556 A.2d at 1113; Harig
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp .• 284 Md. 70. 83-84. 394 A.2d 299. 306-07
(1978).
118. Phipps. 278 Md. at 351. 363 A.2d at 955.
119. Id. at 352. 363 A.2d at 963. The court reasoned that
the seller is not an insurer. as absolute liability is not imposed on the
seller for any injury resulting from the use of his product. Proof of
a defect in the product at the time it leaves the control of the seller
implies fault on the part of the seller sufficient to justify imposing
liability for injuries caused by the product.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Harig. 284 Md. at 83-84. 394 A.2d at 307
("'[T]he major distinction between an action in strict liability in tort and one
founded on traditional negligence theory relates to the proof which must be
presented by the plaintiff. .. ·) (quoting Phipps, 278 Md. at 350-51. 363 A.2d
at 962).
120. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co .• 802 F.2d 75. 81 (3d CiT. 1986).
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sequently, the concepts of fault and causation are inherent in Maryland's strict products liability policy.
The absence of a causal relationship between Nissen and the
alleged harm was pivotal to the court's decision.12l Based on the
facts, Nissen was not the seller and was not responsible for bringing
the defective product and the plaintiff together. 122 The court also
concluded that extension of liability under the continuity of enterprise
theory would frustrate the need for stability and predictability in
business transactions because unforeseeable products liability claims
discourage corporate transfers and acquisitions. ~23 The court rejected
the argument that a successor corporation should be held liable
because it benefits from the goodwill of the predecessor, finding
instead that when a predecessor's defective products cause injuries,
the successor will "suffer a resultant loss in the value of the goodwill
it purchased."I24 Because the successor loses some of the benefit of
.its original bargain, further imposition of liability for the predecessor's product defects would be inequitable. 125
Because it emphasized the causation requirement inherent in
strict liability law, the court accepted much of the rationale advanced
in Polius. 126 Like the Polius court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
dismissed the notion of the successor as a "deep pocket" that was
best able to bear the burden of product defects by assuming the riskspreading role and protecting itself with liability insurance. 127 Consistent with Polius, the court also concluded that well established
corporate law policies deserve at least as much merit as the evolving
strict products liability policies and concerns. This finding is evident
in the court's attack on the Turner decision, where it stated "[w]e
do not agree that traditional rules of successor liability should be
'shaken off' as 'impediments.'"128 This tendency to discard corporate
law principles and focus exclusively on strict liability concerns was a
significant factor in the court's rejection of the rationale in Cyr,
Turner and their progeny. The predominant reason for the court's
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Nissen, 323 Md. at 624, 633, 594 A.2d at 569, 574.
Id. at 625, 594 A.2d at 570.
Id. at 624 n.2, 594 A.2d at 569 n.2.
Id. at 629, 594 A.2d at 570.
Because the successor pays for the predecessor's goodwill in the asset transfer,
subsequently discovered product defects diminish the benefit of the successor's
bargain by damaging the company's reputation, the product's reputation, or
both. Therefore, holding a successor liable for the defective products of its
predecessor serves as a double penalty against the successor. See Murphy,
supra note 37, at 835·36.
126. Nissen, 323 Md. at 627, 594 A.2d at 571.
127. Id. at 624·25, 594 A.2d at 569·70.
128. Id. at 629, 594 A.2d at 572 (quoting Turner v. Bituminous Gas Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 877 (Mich. 1976».
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rejection of such cases was, however, their disregard for the fundamental concept of fault inherent in tort law. 129
The court's holding is consistent with the majority position and
with Maryland's strict liability policy, which requires some degree of
fault, i.e., a causal relationship between a defendant's acts and a
plaintiff's injuries. 130 The court's decision was well-reasoned because
corporate law policies and strict liability policies each present equally
valid concerns that must be balanced by the court. Just as it is unfair
to destroy a plaintiff's remedy through a corporate transfer of assets,
it is equally unfair to deny a purchasing corporation the benefit of
its bargain through the imposition of unanticipated liabilities.
None of the alternative theories of successor liability directly
apply to the factual circumstances at issue in the case. Inconsistent
with the continuity of enterprise exception, the seller corporation did
not cease ordinary business operations, liquidate and dissolve soon
after the asset transfer. In fact, the transferor was required by
agreement to remain in business for at least five years after the
transfer in order to indemnify the successor from product liability.
Also, the successor relocated the transferor's business, retained only
a few of the transferor's employees, and notified its dealers of the
acquisition. 13I Contrary to the product line theory, the successor's
acquisition of the transferor's assets did not destroy the injured
plaintiff's recourse to the predecessor, and the injured plaintiff was
notified of the acquisition. 132 Lastly, neither the independent duty to
warn nor the bona fide purchaser theories apply under the circumstances at issue because there was no evidence that the successor
corporation had any knowledge of defects in the predecessor's productS.133
Although the court considered the societal value of allowing a
consumer to recover for his injuries, it stressed the unfairness of
requiring a successor to bear the cost of "unassumed and uncontemplated products liability claims primarily because it is still in business
and is perceiv,ed as a 'deep pocket." ' 134 The court, however, failed
to consider what remedies, if any, remain for an injured consumer
when the successor's acquisition later eliminates the predecessor and
destroys the ability of the injured party to seek redress from the
party actually responsible for the defective product. In Nissen, one
might reasonably expect that after the passage of the required five
year indemnification period, the successor corporation should be
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at
at
at

633, 594 A.2d at 574.
623, 633, 594 A.2d at 569, 574.
616, 594 A.2d at 565.
626, 594 A.2d at 570.
626 n.3, 594 A.2d at 570 n. 3.
624, 594 A.2d at 569.
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subject to liability. Just as the four established exceptions protect
creditors and shareholders by precluding a change in corporate structure that permits a corporation to escape debts and liabilities, the
law should protect products liability plaintiffs by precluding any
manipulation of corporate structure which circumvents future products liability claims.
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Nissen
Corp. v. Miller reaffirms Maryland's conservative stance with respect
to products liability law 13s and reinforces Maryland's strict liability
policy which requires fault in order to impose tort liability. 136 Recognition of only the traditional exceptions to the general rule of
successor nonliability, on the other hand, fails to respond to the
legitimate interests of products liability plaintiffs. To protect products
liability plaintiffs from the elimination of remedies, and successor
corporations from the imposition of unknown liabilities, Maryland
should consider adoption of the independent duty to warn and bona'
fide purchaser theories. Both of these theories comport with the
causation rationale of Maryland's strict liability policies and with its
corporate law policies.
It is inappropriate to allow products liability law to develop in
this context on a case-by-case basis in the courts, because such a
policy promotes inconsistent results and forces the courts to give
preferred consideration to one -of two equally important areas of
law. The issue would be best addressed by the legislature 137 through
a statutory standard that requires business entities to accommodate
future products liability claims and imposes liability by default if the
parties fail to meet the standard.

Donna M.D. MacDonald

135. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes Il4-18 and accompanying text.
137. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ohio 1987).

